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5.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann § 78-2a-3(2)(j). Judge Dennis
A. Fredrick entered a final order granting the State of Utah's motion for directed verdict
on July 22, 1998. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on August 21, 1998. On December
12, 1998, the appeal was transferred from the Supreme Court of Utah to the Utah Court
of Appeals.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Issue: Whether the district court erred when it held that expert testimony was

required to establish the standard of care, where Collins alleged simple negligence, not
professional negligence, and where lay jurors could understand the standard of care
without expert testimony.
Citation to Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Tr. at 334; Aplt. App. at 107.
Standard of Review: This Court reviews all evidence in the light most favorable to
Collins, and must reverse the district court's directed verdict unless there was no
competent evidence to support a verdict for Collins. Merino v. Albertson's. 363 UAR 8,
8 (Utah February 19, 1999).
II. Whether the District Court erred in refusing to qualify Dr. Mustard as an
expert witness, (a) where its refusal was based on a misapplication of law, or
alternatively, (b) where Dr. Mustard's prior education and experience in risk management
at comparable facilities qualified him to testify as to the standard of care the Center owed
to Collins.
Citation to Record to Preserve Issue (a) on Appeal: Tr. at 334; Aplt. App. at 107.
Standard of Review: (a) This Court reviews the district court's application of law
for correctness. Walker v. Union Pacific R. Co.. 844 P.2d 335, 343 (Utah Ct. App.
1992). Exclusion of expert testimony that is based the district court's misapplication of
law is an abuse of discretion. Id. This Court must reverse if the district court misapplied
the law when it excluded Dr. Mustard's testimony.
2

Citation to Record to Preserve Issue (b) on Appeal: Tr. at 18-19; Aplt. App. at 8182.
Standard of Review: (b) This Court reviews the district court's exclusion of expert
testimony for an abuse of discretion. Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993).
Experts can be qualified to testify based on their experience, and not merely their
licensure. Id.

3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES AND
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE
APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
1.

Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code. Ann. § 78-14-3; Aplt. App.
at 120.

2.

50(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Aplt. App. at 129.

3.

702 Utah Rules of Evidence; Aplt. App. at 121.

4.

Utah Admin. R. 432-5-(l) through (6); Aplt. App. at 56.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Vickie Collins ("Collins") is a profoundly mentally retarded person. At the time
of her swing injuries on March 9, 1994, she was forty-one years old, but functioned
mentally at the level of a three year old. Collins resided at the Utah State Developmental
Center ("Center") for about twenty-eight years prior to her swing injuries. Collins had a
lifelong seizure history, and suffered from multiple types of seizures. Collins also
suffered from schizophrenia. She resided at the Center because her disabilities prevented
her from being able to care for herself, and she needed help to survive.
The Center cared for all of Collins' needs. The Center treated her seizures and
schizophrenia, but also took care of Collins other everyday needs. Among others, those
needs included Collins' personal hygiene, preparing her meals, and choosing activities
that were safe for her in light of her limited abilities.
The Center had protected Collins from seizure injuries in the past. When she
suffered from seizures in the past, the Center had required her to wear a helmet. The
Center had also restricted her activities, including swimming and swinging. Since
reaching the age of majority, Collins has never had a legal guardian. Instead, the Center
had a limited guardianship to provide Collins with medical treatment. Collins' mother,
Darlene Collins, was not consulted about the Center's safety measures to protect Collins.
Darlene trusted the Center to protect Collins because they had reasonably protected her
from seizure injuries in the past

5

Collins' seizure activity elevated significantly in 1993. The Center's individual
plan for Collins - the "Individual Habitation Plan," or IHP - noted Collins' elevated
seizure levels, and recommended follow up medical treatment. The IHP was completed
less than six months before Collins was paralyzed when she seizured and fell from a
swing.
Collins loved to swing. The Center knew that Collins enjoyed swinging, and on
several occasions, the staff had observed Collins' swing so hard that they were
"concerned about the height of her swinging." Although the Center was concerned about
the height of Collins' swinging, the Center was not concerned about the increased risk of
serious injury if Collins fell from a swing due to a seizure.
On December 9, 1993, exactly three months to the day before Collins' swing
accident, she seizured and fell (but not from a swing), and seriously injured her head and
neck. Because of that injury, the staff decided to make Collins wear a purple football
helmet when she ambulated. The staff that initiated the helmet idea were not nurses,
doctors, or mental retardation professionals. Instead, they were Collins' direct care staff
- lay persons without formal training apartfromtraining they received at the Center.
Collins continued to seizure. After requiring Collins to wear a helmet, in the three
months between her December, 1993 injury, and her March, 1994 injury, Collins suffered
at least ten more seizures witnessed and recorded by the staff. Despite her increased
seizure activity, and recent seizure injuries, the Center did not modify or restrict any of
Collins' activities in connection with her increased seizures. It did not occur to the
6

Center that Collins increased the risk of serious injuries if she fell from a swing due to
seizure. It was undisputed that no staff- professional or non-professional - ever
considered any modifications to Collins' swinging in connection with her seizures.
On March 9, 1994, Collins went outside to swing. The swings located next to her
residence had no restraints to keep ridersfromfalling out ("open swings"). Other swings
with metal seats, seat backs and handles ("structured swings") were visible from the open
swings. Collins immediately went to the open swings, and began to swing high. She was
swinging so high that Becky Jo Kent, Collins' direct staff person, was concerned about
the height of Collins' swinging, and warned Collins not to swing so high.
Kent and one other staff were trying to supervise eight residents, including Collins.
Kent was about fifteen feet from Collins, and was playing ball with another resident
when she heard a loud "thud." Kent looked over and saw Collins laying on the ground in
back of the open swings. Collins was not moving. She sustained a burstfractureof her
seventh thoracic vertebra, and was permanently paralyzed.
Collins brought a negligence action against the Center in district court. Collins'
complaint alleged that the Center was negligent because it permitted her to swing in the
open swings in spite of her increased seizure condition, and that its breach of duty caused
her paralysis. Collins did not allege any negligence on the part of any individual.
Nonetheless, Collins complied with the requirements of the Utah Malpractice Act
because the Center was considered a health care facility under the Act.

7

At trial, the following documents were accepted into evidence in support of
Collins' case in chief: Collins' IHP; the Center's Client Safety Policy; the Center's
Seizure - No Swimming List; the Center's seizure records for Collins for both 1993 and
1994; and, the incident report completed by the Center because of Collins' December,
1993 seizure fall injury. Collins also put on the testimony of Kent, who testified to the
facts as outlined above, and that she knew Collins needed help making decisions that
affected her safety.
Collins attempted to introduce the testimony of Dr. Lewis Mustard, who was
Collins' expert witness on the standard of care for care facilities like the Center. The
district court granted the Center's motion to exclude Dr. Mustard's testimony because it
concluded that he was not qualified to opine on the standard of care, in spite of his
education and experience with similar facilities.
At the close of Collins' case, the Center moved for a directed verdict. The district
court granted the Center's motion for two reasons: 1) the district court found that because
Collins' case involved undefined "specialized" medical treatment, expert testimony was
necessary to establish the applicable standard of care; 2) the district court also concluded
that Collins had failed to meet her burden of proof because Dr. Mustard was not qualified
to provide expert testimony, and directed a verdict for the Center.
Collins appeals the District Court's decision for two reasons. First, it was error to
require expert testimony to establish the standard of care for a medical malpractice
action, unless lay jurors could not understand the duty of care owed to Collins. Jurors did
8

not need expert testimony to understand that the Center's failure to even consider the
need to restrict or modify Collins' swinging was a breach of the Center's duty to
reasonably protect Collins. The weight of authority shows that in cases where simple
negligence is at issue, the duty of care, and the breach of that duty are appropriately left
for lay jurors to decide.
Second, the district court abused its discretion when it refused to qualify Dr.
Mustard as an expert witness because: 1) the district court misapplied the law in refusing
to permit Dr. Mustard's testimony; or, alternatively, 2) Dr. Mustard was qualified to
provide expert testimony as to the duty of care that the Center owed to Collins. This
Court should reverse the district court's directed verdict, and remand this case for a new
trial.

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

Expert testimony is not required to establish the appropriate standard of care

in negligence cases unless lay jurors can not understand the duty of care, and breach,
without expert testimony. Ordinary negligence that arises in health care facilities does
not automatically require expert testimony. This Court has previously held that no expert
testimony was required to establish the standard of care applicable to a residential care
center, where no professional negligence was at issue. Other courts who addressed this
same issue have held that no expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care
at facilities like the Center, unless the care at issue is professional medical care, and
expert testimony is required for jurors to understand the duty of care. In Collins' case,
the care at issue was the Center's failure to consider the danger of permitting Collins to
swing in light of her increased seizure level. No professional medical treatment was
required to consider the danger of serious injury from falling from a swing to a known
seizure victim like Collins. The district court erred in granting the Center's directed
verdict, where the care at issue could be understood by lay jurors, and required no expert
testimony.
II.

The district court abused its discretion in refusing to qualify Dr. Mustard as

an expert, because it misapplied the law, or failed to acknowledged that Dr. Mustard was
a qualified expert witness. To the extent that the district court's refusal to permit Dr.
Mustard's testimony was based on its belief that expert testimony was required in
Collins' case, it was based on a misapplication of law, and is a per se abuse of discretion.
10

Alternatively, Dr. Mustard was qualified to provide testimony as to the applicable
standard of care because of his education and experience inriskmanagement as an
administrator for facilities like the Center.

11

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On March 9, 1994, Vickie Collins ("Collins") was paralyzed when she fell

from a swing at the Utah State Developmental Center ("Center). Complaint of Vickie
Collins; Aplt. App. at 3.
2.

The Center is a intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded

("ICFMR"), and is licensed by the State of Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-13.5; Aplt.
App. at 6.
3.

There are no state or federal standards that mandate the use of swings at

ICFMRs.
4.

At the time of her fall, Collins was 40 years old and had lived at the Center

for approximately twenty eight years. Individualized Habitation Plan of Vickie Collins
(September 16, 1993) [hereinafter: "IHP"]; Aplt. App. at 7.
5.

Collins lived at the Center because she was severely mentally retarded, and

was unable to care for herself. IHP; Aplt. App. at 7.
6.

Collins suffered from several types of seizures, including grand mal, petit

mal, and atonic ("sudden drop") seizures. Some of her seizures caused her to fall to the
ground, while others lasted only moments, and had few observable symptoms.
Testimony of Becky Jo Kent [hereinafter: "Kent Testimony"], Tr. at 215-220; Aplt. App.
at 22-27.
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7.

Collins also suffered from schizophrenia. IHP; Aplt. App. at 7.

8.

The Center had provided Collins with comprehensive care for her individual

needs. Utah Admin. R. 432-15l-(l)-(6); Aplt. App. at 56. For Collins, this care included
medical care to treat her seizures and schizophrenia. IHP; Aplt. App. at 7.
9.

The Center had a limited guardianship over Collins for the purpose of

providing her with medical treatment. IHP; Aplt. App. at 7. Collins' mother, Darlene
Collins, was not Collins' guardian at the time of her injuries. Id.
9.

The Center provided comprehensive life care for Collins. The Center took

care of Collins' personal hygiene, prepared her meals, and taught her survival and social
skills. See generally, IHP; Aplt. App. at 7-20. The Center also took Collins on trips
outside the Center, and provided Collins with recreational activity choices while she was
at the Center. IHP; Aplt. App. at 8, 10-12, 16 and 18, and Kent Testimony, Tr. at 239-40;
Aplt. App. at 39-40.
11.

The Center took into account each resident's individualized needs, abilities,

and limitations, to develop specific individualized plans. See generally. IHP; Aplt. App.
at 7-20. These plans were called Individual Habitation Plans, or "IHPs." Id. The IHPs
provided specific treatment objectives and plans for residents' medical, recreational,
social, dietary, and other needs. Id.
12.

Many of the Center's residents suffered from seizures. Kent Testimony, Tr.

at 217-218; Aplt. App. at 24-5. The Center staff ("Staff') recorded any seizures they
witnessed. Id. at 221-22; Aplt. App. at 28-29.
13

13.

The Center had a Client Safety Policy for residents who were in danger of

falling because of seizures, or other reasons. Client Safety Policy: Aplt. App. at 59-60.
14.

The Center also had a Seizure - No Swimming List that prohibited residents

from swimming under any circumstances if they suffered a major motor seizure within
three months. Seizure - No Swimming List: Aplt. App. at 61.
15.

On September 16, 1993, the Center completed a new IHP for Collins. IHP:

Aplt. App. at 7-20. The IHP noted that Collins' seizure medications were being changed,
and that her seizure activity had recently increased. Id.; Aplt. App. at 17. The IHP
referred Collins to the Center's seizure clinic. Id.; Aplt. App. at 17.
16.

The IHP acknowledged that Collins had the ability to express her

preferences to engage in certain activities. IHP ; Aplt. App. at 8.
17.

Collins' IHP also warned that she did not recognize environmental dangers,

and that she was not traffic safe. IHP ; Aplt. App. at 8 and 18. The Staff knew that
Collins needed help making decisions about her safety. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 235-36;
Aplt. App. at 37-38.
18.

Collins' IHP listed swinging among her recommended recreational

activities. IHP ; Aplt. App. at 11.
19.

After completing Collins' IHP in September, the Center staff witnessed and

recorded the following seizures for Collins: October, 1993 - 2; November, 1993 - 0;
December, 1 9 9 3 - 3 . Utah State Developmental Center Record of Epileptic Seizures for
Vickie L. Collins (1993); Aplt. App. at 62.
14

20.

On December 9, 1993, Collins seizured, fell suddenly, and was injured

when she hit her head on a cabinet. Utah State Developmental Center Record of
Epileptic Seizures for Vickie L. Collins (1993); Aplt. App. at 62, an&Incident Report for
12/9/1993; Aplt. App. at 63, and, Kent Testimony, Tr. at 224-229; Aplt. App. at 31-35.
21.

After Collins9 ground level injury, some members of the Staff thought it

would be a good idea to require Collins to wear a helmet to protect her when she seizured
again. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 228-30; Aplt. App. at 34-36. The Staff initiated a drive for
Collins' helmet, obtained the necessary approvals, and thereafter required Collins to wear
a helmet when she ambulated. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 228-30 and 247; Aplt. App. at 3436, and 47. The helmet was purple, and had a plastic piece over Collins' face to protect
her if she fell forward. Testimony of Darlene Collins, Tr. at 98; Aplt. App. at 67; and,
Kent Testimony, Tr. at 246; Aplt. App. at 46.
22.

The Center had undertaken seizure safety measures for Collins during her

years at the Center. A few years after Collins began living at the Center, the Center
required Collins to wear a helmet. Testimony of Darlene Collins, Tr. at 93, 97-99; Aplt.
App. at 65, 66-68. Collins' mother was not consulted about the Center's decision at that
time. Testimony of Darlene Collins, Tr. at 93, 97-99; Aplt. App. at 65, 66-68. In past
years, the Center did not allow Collins to swing when she was actively seizuring.
Testimony of Darlene Collins, Tr. at 97; Aplt. App. at 66.
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23.

Similarly, the Center did not consult Collins5 mother when it required

Collins to wear the purple helmet just before Collins' injury. Testimony of Darlene
Collins, Tr. at 98-99; Aplt. App. at 67-68.
24.

Collins wore the purple helmet, and continued to suffer from seizures. The

Staff recorded ten seizures for Collins between December 9, 1993, when she fell and
injured her head and neck, and March 9, 1994, the date Collins fell and was paralyzed.
Utah State Developmental Center Record of Epileptic Seizures for Vickie L. Collins
(1994); Aplt. App. at 69.
25.

Collins had always enjoyed swinging. Collins was large and strong, and

would swing very high off the ground. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 252; Aplt. App. at 52.
Before her injuries, Collins had never fallen off a swing for any reason. Id. at Tr. 253;
Aplt. App. at 53.
26.

The Staff never considered that Collins might seizure and fall from her

swing. See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion in Limine (asserting
that Center's testimony that it linked restrictions on Collins5 swinging to her "human
rights" should be barred because the Center never considered restricting Collins'
swinging for any reason); Aplt. App. at 76-77; and Excerpted Arguments of Counsel,
District Court Rulings and Testimony of Dr. Lewis W. Mustard [hereinafter: "Excerpted
Arguments, Rulings and Testimony"] ("[T]o say that this was a 'human rights issue'
when there is no factual basis upon which to come to that conclusion except that it was in

16

the back of everyone's mind I think is going somewhat far afield . . . [T]he motion is well
taken in that regard and I am going to grant it. "); Tr. at 201-02; Aplt. App. at 89-90.
27.

Instead, the Staff was concerned about the height of Collins' swinging, and

not her seizures. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 252-53; Aplt. App. at 52-53. Accordingly, the
Staff never considered modifying or restricting Collins' swinging activity in connection
with her increased seizures. Id. at Tr. 251-52; Aplt. App. at 51-52.
28.

At the time of Collins' injuries, Kent did not know that Collins was

prohibited from swimming under the Center's Seizure - No Swimming List. Kent
Testimony, Tr. at 241; Aplt. App. at 41.
29.

At the time of Collins' injuries, Kent thought that the Client Safety Policy

did not apply to Collins' swinging. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 243-46; Aplt. App. at 43-46.
Consequently, Kent did not believe that Collins was prohibited from swinging under the
Policy, or that the Policy required Kent to be attentive and within arm's reach while
Collins was swinging.. Id., Tr. at 244-45; Aplt. App. at 44-45.
30.

The Center had two types of swings. One type was a single strap of flexible

material that functioned as a seat, suspended by two chains that hung from a metal
standard. It had no seat back to keepridersfromfalling backward, and nofrontrestraint
to keepridersfromfalling forward. This type of swing ("open swing") was located
directly outside Collins residence. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 249; Aplt. App. at 49.
31.

The second type of swing had a metal seat, metal seat back, and metal

handles, and requiredridersto climb into it. This second type of swing ("closed swing")
17

was located across a grassy area, and behind a low fence, in view of the open swings next
to Collins' residence. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 249; Aplt. App. at 49.
32.

On March 9, 1994, Collins and seven other residents went outside to play.

They were accompanied by two staff members, including Becky Jo Kent ("Kent"). Kent
Testimony, Tr. at 247; Aplt. App. at 47. Collins was wearing her purple helmet. Id. at Tr.
246; Aplt. App. at 46.
33.

Collins went immediately to the swings. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 247; Aplt.

App. at 47. Collins was swinging so high that Kent became concerned for Collins'
safety, and asked Collins not to swing so high. Id. at Tr. 248, 252-53; Aplt. App. at 48,
52-53. Kent did not prevent Collins from continuing to swing, or offer to let Collins
swing on the closed swings. Id. at Tr. 252; Aplt. App. at 52.
34.

Kent was playing "talking and playing ball" with another client, and was not

watching Collins. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 248; Aplt. App. at 48. Kent was standing
approximately ten to fifteen feet awayfromCollins. Id., Tr. at 253-54; Aplt. App. at 5354.
35.

Collins seizured, briefly lost consciousness, and fell from the swing.

Testimony of Dr. Dennis J. Wyman, Tr. at 167-69; Aplt. App. at 115-17.
36.

Kent heard a loud "thud," and looked over toward Collins, who was lying

on the ground in back of the swing set. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 248; Aplt. App. at 48.
37.

No one saw the heightfromwhich Collins fell, but Collins landed with such

force that she sustained a burstfractureof her seventh thoracic vertebra when she hit the
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ground. Testimony of Dr. Dennis J. Wyman, Tr. at 165-66; Aplt. App. at 113-14.
Collins5 fall caused her to be permanently paralyzed. Id., Tr. at 166; Aplt. App. at 114.
38.

Collins' life care planner, Stephen Anderson, testified that paraplegics like

Collins typically suffer from bladder infections, bowel impaction, problems with
contractures and decubitus ulcers (pressure sores), as well as mobility problems from
being unable to walk. Testimony of Stephen Anderson, Tr. at 305; Aplt. App. at 119.
39.

Collins' Complaint alleged that the Center was negligent, and did not allege

professional negligence of a particular individual or specialist. Complaint of Vickie
Collins; Aplt. App. at 3-4.
40.

Collins complied with the requirements of the Utah Medical Malpractice

Act (the "Act") because the Center is considered a "health care facility" under the Act,
which applies to all tort actions against health care facilities, even if no professional
malpractice is alleged. Utah Code Ann § 78-14-3(11) and (14); Aplt. App. at 120.
41.

At trial, Collins' witnesses included Darlene Collins, Sherrie Carroll, Becky

Jo Kent, Steve Anderson - a life care planner, and Dr. Lewis Mustard. All witnesses
testified except Dr. Mustard.
42.

Collins tried to present expert testimony from Dr. Lewis Mustard, Ph.D.

Excerpted Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 274; Aplt. App. at 91. Dr. Mustard
held a Ph.D in Health Administration, among his many degrees and certificates.
Curriculum Vitae of Lewis Williams Mustard: Aplt. App. at 122. Dr. Mustard taught
numerous courses and seminars in the areas of health care management and
19

administration, as an adjunct professor. Id.; Aplt. App. at 123-24, 126-27. Dr. Mustard
had twenty-five years of professional experience in the area of hospital administration.
Id.; Aplt. App. at 123. Dr. Mustard served as an administrator over an intermediate care
facility for the mentally retarded - the same type of facility as the Center. Excerpted
Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 279; Aplt. App. at 93. Dr. Mustard
specifically dealt with risk management and safety issues at that facility. Excerpted
Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 280; Aplt. App. at 94. Dr. Mustard also
managed nursing homes and a retirement care center in the area of patient care
management. Excerpted Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 282; Aplt. App. at 96.
Dr. Mustard had also testified in several facility negligence cases similar to Collins' case.
Excerpted Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 282; Aplt. App. at 96.
43.

Dr. Mustard was prepared to testify as to risk management standards that

were applied at comparable facilities, including care facilities for disabled residents,
hospitals, and nursing homes. Excerpted Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 285;
Aplt. App. at 97.
44.

The Center objected to Dr. Mustard testifying as an expert witness.

Excerpted Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 15-24; Aplt. App. at 79-88. See
generally. 702 Utah Rules of Evidence; Aplt. App. at 121. After voir dire examination,
the district court granted the Center's motion. Excerpted Arguments, Rulings and
Testimony, Tr. at 293-95; Aplt. App. at 101-03.
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45.

At the close of Collins' case, the Center moved for a directed verdict.

Excerpted Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 331; Aplt. App. at 104. See
generally, 50(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Aplt. App. at 129. The district court
concluded that Collins' case involved "specialized" medical treatment, and required
expert testimony to establish the standard of care, and a breach of that standard.
Excerpted Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 337; Aplt. App. at 110. The district
court, however, did not articulate what "specialized" care it believed was at issue, which
required expert testimony. Id. The district court granted the Center's directed verdict.
Id. On July 22, 1998, the district court signed its order that granted the Center's directed
verdict.
46.

On August 18, 1998, notice of the signed order was filed in district court.

On August 21, 1998, Collins filed a notice of appeal. On September 30, 1998, the district
court entered an order and judgment granting the Center's costs against Collins. On
December 12, 1998, the Supreme Court of Utah assigned this case to the Court of
Appeals of the State of Utah.
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ARGUMENT
I

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DIRECTED A VERDICT FOR
THE CENTER BECAUSE NO EXPERT TESTIMONY IS REQUIRED TO
ESTABLISH THE STANDARD OF CARE IN A NEGLIGENCE CASE
UNLESS THE CARE OF A SPECIFIC PROFESSIONAL IS AT ISSUE.
A

This Court Must Review The Evidence In The Light Most Favorable To
Collins. And Must Reverse The District Court Unless No Reasonable
Person Could Find That The Center Breached Its Duty To Collins.

This Court must review the facts in the light most favorable to Collins. The
Supreme Court has held that, "A trial court is justified in granting a directed verdict only
if, examining all evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no
competent evidence that would support a verdict in the non-moving party's favor."
Merino v. Albertsons. Inc.. 363 Utah Adv. Rep 8, 8 (Utah February 19,1999) (emphasis
added). This Court has held that a directed verdict is only appropriate "when reasonable
minds could not differ on the facts to be determined from the evidence presented."
Olympus Hills Center. Ltd.. v. Smiths Food and Drug Centers. Inc.. 889 P.2d 445, 450
(Utah Ct. App. 1994)(citations omitted).
Negligence issues are generally not susceptible to summary adjudication, either for
or against claimants. See, e^g,, English v. Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) ("summary judgment should be granted with great caution where negligence is
alleged . . . . [accordingly, summary judgment is reserved for only the most clear-cut
negligence cases.") (citations omitted), affd on other grounds. 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993);
and Swann v. Len-Care Rest Home. Inc.. 490 S.E.2d 572, 574 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997)
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(reversing directed verdict where 98 year old plaintiff showed that rest home knew of
need to restrain herfromstanding because of her propensity to fall when trying to stand
up). Consequently, this Court must reverse the district court if there was competent
evidence to support a verdict for Collins.
B

Expert Testimony Is Only Required In Medical Malpractice Cases Where
Professional Medical Care Is At Issue. And Where Lav Jurors need Expert
Testimony to Understand the Appropriate Duty of Care.

Utah law does not require expert testimony in medical malpractice cases unless the
plaintiff puts professional negligence at issue, and then, only if lay jurors can not
understand the appropriate standard of care without expert testimony. As a threshold
matter, Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence does not require plaintiffs to present
expert testimony to establish a prima facie case of negligence. Instead, the Rule permits
expert witnesses to testify if "technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence, or to understand a fact in issue." Utah R. Evid.
702; Aplt App. at 121. The law of whether expert witnesses are required in negligence
cases is found in the common law. This Section sets forth the applicable law to
Collins'case.
First, expert witnesses are generally required in classic medical malpractice cases
where professional negligence is alleged. There are, however, exceptions that apply to
Collins' case. Expert testimony is not required cases where lay jurors can understand the
applicable standard of care, even where professional negligence is alleged. In addition,
no expert testimony is required where plaintiffs do not allege professional negligence.
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Finally, applying the law to Collins' case, Collins' complaint, along with the evidence at
trial, put the Center's risk management practices, or lack thereof, squarely at issue.1 The
evidence showed that the Center - not any specific individuals - had the duty to
reasonably protect Collins from harm in light of her seizures. Nonetheless, the district
court concluded that the Center had provided "specialized" health care services to
Collins, and therefore required Collins to present expert testimony to establish the
standard of care and breach of that standard. The district court's directed verdict must be
reversed because no expert testimony was required to establish that the Center breached
its duty to reasonably protect Collins in light of her seizures.
1

Although Expert Testimony is Generally Required in Medical
Malpractice Cases, An Exception Applies to Collins' Case: No
Expert Testimony is Required When Lay Jurors Can Understand
the Standard of Care Without Expert Testimony.

The weight of authority shows that expert testimony is only required in medical
malpractice cases where professional medical care is at issue. Expert testimony is
generally required to establish the standard of care owed to the plaintiff where specific
professional medical care is at issue. See, e.g.. Chadwick v. Nielson. 763 P.2d 817, 821,
n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding that standard of care must be established by expert

1

Collins brought a facility negligence action, and did not allege any professional
negligence. Facts ^f 1. The district court simply ignored Collins' theory of the case, and
converted it into a professional negligence action. This is especially troublesome because the
district court failed to explain exactly what "specialized" health care was at issue, and why it
required expert testimony. Facts % 45. The facts show that the Center had a duty of care to
reasonably protect Collins, as opposed to any particular professional. See discussion infra, at Part
IC.
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medical testimony to present prima facie medical malpractice case involving doctor
negligence). This general rule, however, is subject to important exceptions that apply to
Collins' case.
Expert testimony is not required to establish the appropriate standard of care if lay
jurors can understand the standard of care without expert testimony - even where
professional medical treatment is at issue. Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah
1980) (holding expert testimony not required to establish standard of care when needle
left in patient after surgery). The Nixdorf Court explained that where the "propriety of
the treatment received is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman,
expert testimony is unnecessary to establish the professional standard of care." Id. at
352. In another words, expert testimony is only necessary where professional medical
care is at issue and the proper standard of care can not be ascertained by lay jurors
without the help of expert testimony. Cases involving professional negligence may
require expert testimony from a professional to understand the applicable duty of care,
but simple negligence cases generally require no expert testimony to establish a prima
facie case.2 In this case, no breach of professional duty was alleged, and lay jurors could
understand the Center's duty to act reasonably under the circumstances.

2

For the purpose of this Brief, "simple negligence" will refer to the negligent acts of
non-professionals whose duty requires no expert testimony because the duty of care can be
understood by lay jurors. In contrast, "professional negligence" will refer to a breach of the
standard of care owed by a particular professional to a tort victim, whose duty may require expert
testimony for jurors to understand the duty of care.
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2

Negligence in Health Care Facilities That Involves NonProfessional Care Requires No Expert Testimony.

Negligence in health care facilities does not always involve professional medical
care. Under Utah law, any action, including any tort - negligent or otherwise committed by any "health care provider" is deemed a "medical malpractice" action. Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14).3 Because "medical
malpractice" actions include all torts committed by health care providers, the duty of care
must be determined by first examining whether professional conduct is at issue. As one
court stated, "Not all injuries that occur in a hospital, nursing home, or other health care
facility are a result of professional negligence; they may be solely attributable to ordinary
or simple negligence." Moore v. Lewis Smith Memorial Hosp., Inc., 454 S.E.2d 190,
191 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that injury suffered while plaintiff was moved from
wheelchair to bed in health care facility was ordinary negligence, and not medical
malpractice).

3

The Act expansively defines a "malpractice action against a health care provider"
as "any action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty,
wrongful death, or otherwise . ..." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14); Aplt. App. at 120. Collins
does not dispute that the Act applies to her case. Instead, Collins disputes that expert testimony
is required because the Act applies to her case. Under Utah law, "medical malpractice" actions
need not involve professional negligence, and accordingly, need not require expert testimony to
establish the duty of care.
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3

The Facts Show That The Center's Failure To Reasonably
Protect Collins Was At Issue, And Not The Care Of Any
Particular Professional.

Collins brought a simple negligence action against the Center - not a professional
malpractice action. Collins' Complaint alleged no professional negligence. Facts If 1.
Instead, Collins alleged that the Center, and not a particular professional, owed her a duty
of care which was breached and proximately caused her to be paralyzed. Id. The facts
showed that no particular staff- professional or non-professional - had the specific duty
to consider Collins' safety in light of her increased seizures, her recent seizure injury, and
her habit of swing at dangerous heights. Factsfflf8-11. The district court simply
ignored Collins' facility negligence theory, and erred when it concluded that expert
testimony was required, because the Collins never put the conduct of any particular
professional at issue.4
In Collins' case, this Court must focus on the care at issue, and not merely where it
happened, to determine whether expert testimony was required to establish the Center's
duty of care to reasonably protect Collins. See, e.g., Beverly Enterprise-Virginia, Inc.,
T/A, Etc. v. Nichols, 441 S.E.2d 1 (Va. 1994) (holding no expert testimony required to

4

The district court apparently believed that expert testimony was required because
the Center delegated some of Collins5 care to a treatment team made of professionals and nonprofessionals, even though no professional - or non-professional - had this specific duty to
reasonably protect Collins in light of her increased seizures. The district court's conclusion that
expert testimony was required establishes an obtuse and unworkable precedent for tort victims
trying to establish the duty of care in cases like Collins'. See discussion infra, at Part ID.
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establish negligence of nursing home where patient choked on food and died, and whose
employees failed to assist patient with eating who had a history of choking problems);
and, Williamson v. Provident Group. Inc.. 550 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Neb. 1996) (affirming
refusal for directed verdict because no expert testimony required in slip and fall case
involving assisted care facility where no professional negligence alleged), rev'd. on other
grounds.
Collins' position is consistent with Utah law. In Virginia S. v. Salt Lake Care
Center. 741 P.2d 969 (Utah Ct App. 1987), this Court required no expert testimony to
establish the standard of care applicable to a nursing home injury. In that case, a
mentally and physically incapacitated seventeen year old girl was raped while under the
care and custody of the defendant. Id at 972. The trial court refused to permit plaintiffs
obstetrician's testimony because he lacked "sufficient experience with nursing homes to
qualify as an expert on the standard of care applicable to nursing homes." Id This Court
held that "[T]he degree of care which a nursing home owes to its patients is similar to that
owed by a hospital to its patients." Id. (citation omitted). This Court further held that it
was the "duty of the nursing home to provide a reasonable standard of care taking into
account the patients' mental and physical condition." Id (citation omitted).
Similarly, the Center must be held to the standard of reasonable care under the
circumstances, including Collins' profound retardation, her inability to understand
hazardous conditions, her heightened seizure level, and the fact that she had recently been
injured when she fell from a seizure. Negligent health care facilities may not be shielded
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from simple negligence actions simply because the statute identifies them as "medical
malpractice actions." Instead, courts must carefully examine the care at issue to
determine whether expert testimony is necessary in each case.
The district court failed to critically examine the specific duty of care owed to
Collins. Although the district court admitted that Collins' case was "not a classic medical
malpractice case," it did not explain why not. Facts % 42. Put simply, Collins' case was
not a "classic medical malpractice case" because Collins alleged no professional
negligence. Also, while the district court concluded that the case "clearly involved the
providing of health care services, which [were] specialized in nature," it failed to identify
which particular health care service(s) were at issue. Id. The district court's failure to
identify the care at issue was especially vexing for two reasons: 1) there was no way to
divine whether the district court understood what particular duty of care was at really at
issue; and 2) the district court assumed - without explanation - that lay jurors could not
understand that duty of care (whatever it was) without expert testimony.5
This Court must reverse the district court because its conclusions about the
requirement of expert testimony were not supported by the facts, or alternatively, against
the weight of authority which required the court to examine the specific duty at issue in
determining when expert testimony is required.

5

Given the standard of review for directed verdicts, that no reasonable juror could
find for the plaintiff, see discussion supra at Part IA, the district court abused its discretion by
failing to explain the factual basis for its legal conclusions.
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C

No Expert Testimony Was Required To Show That The Center Owed
Collins The Duty To Reasonably Protect Her From Harm Because of Its
Special Relationship to Collins. The Center's Safety Policies. Collins'
Individual Habitation Plan, and Common Sense.

Jurors needed no expert testimony to understand that the Center breached its duty
to reasonably protect Collins from harm in light of her seizures. The Center owed Collins
a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances that were established by the facts on
the record. The Center's duty to reasonably protect Collins arose from specific facts that
were part of the district court record: 1) the Center had a "special relationship" to Collins
because of her vulnerability and inability to protect herself; 2) the Center's own safety
policies; 3) Collins' Individualized Habitation Plan; and, 4) applying common sense to
the facts that were reasonably apparent to all staff- professional or not. The facts also
demonstrated that the Center breached its duty because the Center never even considered
restricting or modifying Collins' swinging in light of her increased seizures. Facts Tfl[ 2627. No expert testimony was required for jurors to understand that the Center should
have considered restricting or modifying Collins' swinging until her seizures were better
controlled. This Court should reverse the district court's grant of the Center's motion for
directed verdict because no expert testimony was required to understand the standard of
care and the Center's breach of that duty to Collins.
1

The Center Owed Collins The Duty To Protect Her From Harm
Because Of Its Special Relationship To Collins.

The Center owed Collins a duty to protect her from harm. Generally, there is no
affirmative duty to protect another from harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314.
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Where the defendant stands in a "special relationship" to the victim, however, the
defendant has an affirmative duty to protect the victimfromharm. Beach v. University of
Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986) (citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A,6
with approval). The Supreme Court explained that "[Special] relationships generally
arise when one assumes responsibility for another's safety

" Id According to the

Beach court, "The essence of a special relationship is dependence by one party upon the
other...." WL at 417 (citation omitted)(emphasis added).7 Collins' dependency on the
Center gave rise to the Center's duty to reasonably protect her during her seizures.
Collins' case presents the paradigm of a special relationship. For thirty years, the
Center helped Collins with nearly every facet of her life. Notably, the Center helped
Collins take her seizure and schizophrenia medications. Facts ^ 8. The Center provided
Collins with choices for recreational activities. Facts f 10. The Center also supervised
Collins' traffic safety when she went on outings. Facts 1f 17. Given Collins' severe
mental retardation, schizophrenia, and seizure history, and the Center's comprehensive

6

That section states in pertinent part:
One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the
custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the
other of his normal opportunities for protection is under a similar
duty to the other.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4).
7

In the Beach case, the court found that the University of Utah had no special
relationship to Beach that gave rise to a duty to protect Beachfromfalling and injuring herself on
a University outing where she got drunk. Id at 420.
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care for Collins' needs, the facts show that the Center had a special relationship to
Collins, and owed Collins a duty to protect herfromharm.
Other courts have held that care providers like the Center have a duty to
affirmatively protect profoundly disabled persons like Collins. Hammack v. Lutheran
Soc. Svs. of Michigan, 535 NW.2d 215 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), is nearly identical to
Collins' case. In Hammack the court found that a special relationship existed between a
developmentally disabled individual, who had a history of seizures, and an independent
living home for the developmentally disabled. Id. at 217. In Hammack the client
drowned from a seizure while bathing. Id. The client was a thirty-year-old, mildly
retarded, developmentally disabled man, living in a semi-independent living home for the
developmentally disabled. Id at 216. The defendants argued that due to the emphasis
placed on plaintiffs becoming more independent, it did not have the level of control over
him that gave rise to a duty to monitor the plaintiff while he bathed. Id at 217.8 The
court found that under the circumstances of that case, where the plaintiff had "entrusted
himself to the control and protection of defendant," that defendant had a special
relationship to plaintiff, and owed the plaintiff a duty of care to protect himfromharm.

8

The Center tried to make similar arguments about Collins' humanrightsand the
dignity ofriskin connection with Collins'rightto swing. The district court recognized, however,
that having failed to ever consider restricting Collins' swinging in connection with her seizures,
the Center was barredfromintroducing any such evidence at trial and granted part of Plaintiffs
Motion in Limine. Facts If 26.
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Id. Like the Hammack court, this Court should find that Collins entrusted her protection
and control to the Center, and that the Center had a duty to protect Collins.
This Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict because jurors could
have understood the Center's duty to reasonably protect Collins under the facts of this
case. Collins' dependency on the Center gave rise to its duty to reasonably protect her
from harm. There was no need for expert testimony because the facts that gave rise to the
Center's duty could be understood by lay jurors.
2

The Center Also Owed Collins the Duty to Protect Her Under Its
own Policies and By Applying Common Sense to Protect Collins.
A

The Center's Client Safety Policy Prohibited Collins from
Swinging or From Swinging Without A Staff Member Within
Arm's Reach.

The Center's own policies established a duty to reasonably protect Collins. As a
preliminary matter, the Center had no fall prevention policy in place at the time of
Collins' injuries. The failure to have a fall prevention policy may be considered evidence
of the Center's negligence. Even without a fall prevention policy, however, the Center's
other policies gave rise to its duty to protect Collins at the time of her injuries.
The Center had a duty to protect Collins under its Client Safety Policy. The Client
Safety Policy states that "Staff shall be safety-conscious to prevent the creation of unsafe
conditions and alert for existing conditions which could cause an accident." Facts f 13.
The staff had an affirmative duty under the Safety Policy to consciously prevent unsafe
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conditions that could cause accidents.9 This is consistent with the Center's duty to
protect its severely disabled residents who are unable to identify hazards associated with
particular activities, and need help making decisions about their own safety. Whether the
open swing constituted an unreasonably dangerous condition to a severely retarded
person, who loved to swing, and was then sufferingfromfrequentdrop seizures, and had
recently been injured such a fall, is a fact-specific question for lay jurors to decide. This
Court should reverse the district court's directed verdict because Collins stated a prima
facie case of ordinary negligence for maintaining an unreasonably dangerous condition.
Even apartfromthe dangerous condition issue, the Policy also required a staff
member to be within arm's reach while Collins was swinging. Under the Policy, Collins
should have been within arms reach of a staff member if she was in an area where she
was in danger of falling:
A client whom the treatment team determines to be incapable of
independent action, will not be left unattended by staff [ i n ] . . . areas
where falling .. . may occur. One staff should be in arms reach of
the client under these conditions and other staff should not distract
this attendant.
Aplt. App. at 59. By its terms, the Safety Policy applies to clients who are not capable of
"independent action."

9

The Center had a separate duty to maintain a reasonably safe premises. See, e.g..
Hammack. 535 N.W.2d at 217, (failing to properly monitor tub was unreasonably dangerous
condition for retarded seizure victim who drowned)(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343,
with approval).
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The Safety Policy applied to Collins because clients who are truly capable of
"independent action" can evaluate hazards and risks. Conversely, Collins could not
evaluate the hazards of swinging in her condition. At trial, staff member Becky Jo Kent
("Kent") testified that "independent action" merely referred to a client's physical ability
to do an activity, or to choose to do a specific activity. Tr. at 244-46. Kent's
understanding of the Safety Policy was flawed, because under her reasoning, no client
who was capable of expressing an activity preference or initiating an activity was covered
by the Safety Policy. Instead, the Safety Policy applied to clients who could not evaluate
hazards and risks because the Center puts the responsibility of preventing unsafe
conditions squarely on its staff. Aplt. App. at 59-60. Kent should have been within
arm's reach and fully attentive to Collins if Kent permitted Collins to swing.
This Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict because the Center's
policies and the facts of this case present a prima facie case of negligence that could be
understood by a lay juror. The Client Safety Policy should have prevented Collins from
swinging in the open swing because her seizure level made it an "unsafe condition that
could cause an accident." Alternatively, assuming arguendo that the swing was not an
unreasonably dangerous condition to Collins, she should have been within arm's reach of
an attentive staff member while swinging, not fifteen feet away from a staff who is
monitoring eight clients at once. These duties present fact-based issues that are
understandable to lay jurors. For these reasons, this Court should reverse the district
court's directed verdict, and remand this case for a new trial.
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B

The Center's Seizure Clinic No Swimming List Supports
Application of the Client Safety Policy to Collins

Any doubt about whether the Safety Policy applied to Collins was answered
affirmatively by considering the Center's other seizure policies. The Center's own
"Seizure Clinic - No Swimming Lisf restricted Collins from swimming at the time of her
injuries because of her increased seizures. Under that Policy, clients who have
experienced a major motor seizure are not allowed to swim within three months of the
seizure. Facts If 14. Kent claimed that the Client Safety Policy did not apply to Collins'
swinging because she associated the Policy with "bathing, changing tables, bath tubs.
showers, drowning, lids, falling . ..." Tr. at 244; Aplt. App. at 44; (emphasis added). If
Kent associated the Client Safety Policy with "bathing, bath tubs, showers, drowning,"
and especially "falling," she should have reasonably looked at the No Swim List to
resolve any questions about whether the Client Safety Policy applied to Collins'
swinging. At the time of Collins' injuries, however, Kent admitted that she did not know
that Collins was prohibited from swimming because of her seizures. Facts % 28. The
facts show that the staff did not understand the Center's own policies to protect its
residents.
Lay jurors could understand the Center's duty of care under its own policies.
Taken together, the Center's Seizure Clinic No Swimming Policy and the Client Safety
Policy, illustrate the Center's duty of care to reasonably protect Collins by prohibiting her
from swinging while her seizurefrequencywas elevated. This Court should reverse the

36

district court's directed verdict because no expert testimony is required to understand the
duties that arose under these policies.
C

The Center Breached Its Duty to Collins By Failing to Act
Reasonably In Light of Collins' Individualized Habitation
Plan.

Lay jurors could understand that Collins' Individualized Habitation Plan ("IHP")
reasonably required the Center to consider modifying or restricting Collins' swinging
during her increased seizure period. The information contained in the IHP alerted the
Center to Collins' seizure activity, her inability to recognize dangers, and her swinging.
The IHP states that "[Collins] requires supervision because she is not traffic safe, nor
does she recognize environmental dangers." Facts f 17; Aplt. App. at 8; (emphasis
added). The IHP also states that "[Collins] can swing and use playground equipment."
Id.; Aplt. App. at 11. Under a section entitled "PRIORITIZED NEEDS," the IHP states
that "[Collins] needs to have her seizure condition monitored and controlled with
medications." Id.; Aplt. App. at 13; (bold and capitals in original). The section entitled
"SERVICE OBJECTIVES," reads:
1-S. SEIZURE DISORDER:... This past year [Collins] was
tapered off Tranxzene and did well on monotherapy of
Tegretol. In reviewing records, it is noted that [Collins] has
had a recent increase in seizure activity. She will be referred
to seizure clinic.
Id.; Aplt. App. at 17; (bold and capitals in original)(underline added). All of the
information needed to reasonably alert the Center to the danger of failing to consider
modifications or restrictions to Collins' swinging was contained in Collins' IHP.
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The Center had a duty to consider Collins' IHP in structuring her activities. The
Center was required to take into account Collins' individual needs in determining
appropriate leisure activities. Facts f 10. The Center should have reasonably examined
Collins' leisure activities in connection with her increased seizures. Instead, the Center
failed to take any action to prevent Collins from suffering foreseeable injuries. Facts f26.
This Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict because jurors could have
understood the Center's duty to reasonably protect Collins, and its breach of that duty on
the facts presented at trial.
D

Common Sense Required the Staff to Consider the Danger to
Collins of Permitting Her to Swing While Her Seizure
Activity Was High.

Lay jurors could understand that the Center owed Collins the duty to use common
sense to restrict or modify her swinging while her seizure activity was high. The Center
had the duty to provide Collins with safe leisure choices that took into account her
increased seizure activity. Facts % 10. Kent understood that Collins did not fully
appreciate dangers and risks, and admitted that Collins needed help to make decisions
that affected her health and safety. Facts 117. Kent nonetheless claimed that she used
common sense in deciding to let Collins swing on the date of her injuries. Tr. at 254-55;
Aplt. App. at 54-55. The Center owed Collins a duty of common sense to provide her
with leisure choices that were reasonably safe in light of her seizures. Whether the
Center used sufficient common sense under these facts, however, is a fact-specific jury
question.
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The Center had already used common sense to protect Collins by making her wear
a helmet. The staff understood that Collins5 seizure activity was high, and that she had
already injured herself in a seizure-related fall. Both Kent, and her Program Lead,
Sherrie Robb, initiated the idea of Collins wearing a helmet to protect her because they
reasonably anticipated that Collins would seizure, fall, and hurt herself again. Facts 1f2l.
Neither Kent nor Robb are nurses, doctors, or mental retardation professionals10 - they
simply acted out of common sense to protect Collins.
Although the Center used some common sense in requiring Collins to wear a
helmet, it also should have considered the risks associated with Collins' recreational
activities.11 Common sense dictates that persons like Collins will increase the risk of
serious injury if they seizure and fall while swinging, as opposed to a ground level fall.12
The Center used common sense to recognize that it was dangerous for Collins to swing so
high. Facts ^[27. Despite Collins' recent injuries, and the required purple football helmet,

10

Neither the position of Developmentalist (Kent), nor Program Lead (Robb),
requires any professional licensure.
11

The Center could have discharged its duty to use common sense to reasonably
protect Collins in several ways: It could have restricted Collins' use of the open swings until her
seizure activity was better controlled; it could have limited Collins' swinging to the closed swings
to minimize the risk of her falling if she seizured; it could have followed its own Client Safety
Policy and prevented Collinsfromusing the open swings unless an attentive staff member was
within arm's reach. At minimum, the duty of reasonableness under the circumstances required the
Center to take into account the danger to Collins if she seizured while swinging, but the Center
failed to even consider the danger to Collins if she seizured and fell from the open swings.
12

Collins hit the ground so hard when she fell, that her seventh vertebrae blew apart,
and one of thefragmentscame backward into her spinal cord, causing paralysis. Factsft?7.
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however, the Center failed to connect Collins' high swinging and the risk of falling if she
seizured. Lay jurors could understand that letting Collins swing in an open swing during
her increased seizure period could cause Collins to be seriously injured if she seizured
and fell. No expert testimony was required to understand the Center's duty to use
common sense to reasonably protect Collins.
This Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict because lay jurors
could understand and apply the Center's duty of common sense to reasonably protect
Collins, and understand the Center's breach of that duty under the facts presented at trial.
D.

This Court Should Reverse the District Court's Ruling Because It
Establishes An Ambiguous and Burdensome Precedent For Tort Victims In
Facility Negligence Actions.

This Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict because it conflicts
with established Utah law in simple negligence actions, and establishes unreasonable
barriers to compensation for tort victims. As shown above, Utah law requires expert
testimony only where professional negligence is at issue, and lay jurors can not
understand the duty of care without expert testimony. See discussion supra, at Part IB.
In this case, the district court concluded that expert testimony was required, even though
no professional negligence was alleged, and the district court made no factual finding as
to which professional duty it believed was at issue. This Court should not permit the
district court's ruling to stand because it creates confusion and unreasonable obstacles to
compensating Utah's tort victims, and shields tortfeasors from responsibility.
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The district court's ruling requires tort victims to present expert testimony to
recover in simple negligence actions. This would increase the costs, delays, and
complexity of simple negligence actions. Conversely, the ruling provides no guidance as
to what expert testimony is necessary under facility negligence cases, where a team
provides interdisciplinary treatment to the tort victim. Plaintiffs will be forced to use a
"shotgun" approach, and engage a team of expert witnesses to account for each member
of the interdisciplinary team. Alternatively, even assuming that hiring a team of experts
is not required by the district court's ruling, plaintiffs may still have to engage numerous
experts before courts decide which expert can testify as to the duty of care at issue. This
Court must reverse the district court's ruling because it establishes a confusing and
dangerous precedent for victims of simple facility negligence.
The district court's ruling must also be reversed because it undermines established
Utah legal precedent. As noted above, the ruling is contrary to the weight of authority,
under both Utah law, and the laws of other jurisdictions. As a consequence, the ruling
could spawn significant litigation as courts try to define the limits of "specialized medical
treatment," in the context of facility negligence cases. The ruling would shield tortfeasor
facilities from simple negligence actions because they can hide simple negligence behind
a team of professionals and non-professionals. The ruling also undermines the jury
system because it assumes that jurors can not understand the duty of care in simple
negligence actions if they arise at "health care facilities."
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For the policy reasons set forth above, this Court must reverse the district court's
directed verdict, and remand this case for a new trial.
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II

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
REFUSED TO PERMIT COLLINS' EXPERT WITNESS TO TESTIFY AS
TO THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE FOR THE CENTER
This Court must reverse the district court's refusal to permit Collins' expert

witness to testify. Although district courts have discretion to determine the qualifications
of expert witnesses, that discretion is abused where the court's refusal is based on a
misapplication of law. Alternatively, the district court abuses its discretion where the
expert witness is qualified to assist the jury in understanding the evidence or facts in
issue, and the court refuses to permit that testimony.
A.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion Because Its Refusal To Permit
Was Based On A Misapplication of Law.

This Court must reverse district court's refusal to permit Collins' expert witness to
testify because the court's refusal was based on legal error, and is not entitled to
deference. It is an abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony where the exclusion is
based on a misperception of the law. Walker v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.. Inc.. 844 P.2d 335,
343 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). This is because the district court can not properly exercise its
discretion where its exclusion is based on a legal misconception. Gaw v. State of Utah.
798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert denied, 145 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Utah
1990).
The district court erroneously believed that expert testimony was required to
establish the duty of care that the Center owed to Collins. Collins has shown that no
expert testimony was required because no specific professional conduct was at issue. To
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the extent that any professional conduct was at issue, expert testimony was not required
because the Center's negligence in failing to even consider the increased risk of injury to
Collins from seizuring while swinging was apparent to lay jurors. See discussion supra,
at Part I C .
If this Court determines, however, that expert testimony was necessary, it must
reverse the district court's refusal to permit Collins' expert witness to testify because it
was based on legal error and was therefore an abuse of discretion.
E,

Collins' Witness Was Qualified To Testify As An Expert On The Duty Of
Care That The Center Owed To Collins.

This Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict because its refusal to
allow testimony from Collins' expert witness was an abuse of discretion. The issue was
whether the Center owed Collins a duty to reasonably protect her from injury in light of
her seizures, her recent seizure fall injury, and her preference to swing very high on the
Center's open swings. Collins put at issue the Center's risk management principles that
were in place to protect its residents.13 Collins' expert witness, Dr. Lewis William
Mustard, was qualified to testify as to the standard of care owed by the Center to Collins.
In Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329, 1337 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court held that
a police officer could testify as an expert witness in accident reconstruction, even though

13

To the extent that the district court failed to view this case as a facility negligence
case, and refused to admit testimonyfroma qualified expert in hospital risk management, it is also
a misapplication of law and is an abuse of discretion. See, discussion supra, this section, Part

n.A.
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he had limited training in accident reconstruction. The Court found that the officer's
years of experience in accident investigation qualified him to provide expert testimony.
Id. Relying on Utah R. Evid. 702, the Court stated that "formal training is not a
prerequisite to giving expert testimony, and a witness may qualify as an expert by virtue
of his experience or training." Id. (citations omitted). Similarly, Dr. Mustard's
experience and training qualified him to provide expert testimony.
Dr. Mustard's broad experience and numerous credentials qualified him to testify
as an expert. Dr. Mustard holds a Ph.D in Health administration, among his many
degrees and certifications. Facts Tf42. Dr. Mustard also taught numerous courses and
seminars in the areas of health care management and administration, as an adjunct
professor. Id. Dr. Mustard had twenty-five years of professional experience in the area
of hospital administration. Id. Dr. Mustard served as an administrator over an
intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded - the same type of facility as the
Center. Id. Dr. Mustard specifically dealt withriskmanagement and safety issues at that
facility. Id.; cf., the district court's conclusion that "[Dr. Mustard's] management health
care facilities experience has been by and large in institutions . . . that did not have as
their additional burden dealing with those people who are severely handicapped or
developmentally disabled or mentally retarded."14 Tr. at 294; Aplt. App. at 102. Dr.

14

This conclusion makes little sense when there was no evidence to suggest that
Collins' mental retardation affected any aspect of her seizure activity. The risks of injuries from
falling due to seizures applies to all seizure victims, not just retarded seizure victims. Collins'
inability to "make decisions concerning her safety" illustrates the special relationship between
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Mustard also managed nursing homes and a retirement care center in the area of patient
care management. Facts ^[42. Dr. Mustard has also testified in several facility negligence
cases similar to Collins' case. Facts Tf42; cf, the district court's conclusion that, "[T]he
focus of [Dr. Mustard's] expertise in the area of risk management, I see as something
quite different and distinctfromthe risks inherent in providing health care facilities and
maintenance in [the Center]."15 In short, Dr. Mustard's credentials and relevant
experience qualified him to testify as an expert about the duty of care that the Center
owed to Collins.
Dr. Mustard's testimony would have helped the jury because he would have
testified that the Center had the duty to reasonably protect Collins by considering the risk
to Collins if she were permitted to swing on the open swings and seizured. Dr. Mustard
was prepared to testify that the Center had the duty to apply its own policies, and to
recognize the risks and safety issues in connection with Collins' increased seizures. Facts
1J43. Dr. Mustard would have testified that the Center should have developed safe
recreation alternatives, and discussed with the treatment team. Id.; and Tr. at 287-88;
Aplt. App. at 99-100. Finally, Dr. Mustard would have testified that the Center's duty of
Collins and the Center, see discussion supra, at Part IC, and underscores the importance of the
Center's duty to consider therisksof injury to Collins of permitting her to swing in open swings.
15

Apparently, the district court concluded that risk management and the prevention
of foreseeable accidents was not at issue in Collins' case. It is difficult to divine what other "risks
inherent in providing health care facilities" could be at issue in this case, where no professional
malpractice was alleged. If this Courtfindsthat risk management and the prevention of
foreseeable accidents was at issue, it must reverse because the district court misapplied the law.
See discussion supra this section at Part EL A.
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care was similar to the duty owed to other residents in similar facilities in other States.
Facts 1f43. The district court should have permitted Dr. Mustard to testify as an expert
about risk management at comparable facilities.
This Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict because its failure to
permit testimony from Dr. Mustard was an abuse of discretion. Dr. Mustard was
qualified to testify as an expert, and his testimony should have been admitted, with the
Center's objections going to the weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony. Dr.
Mustard was qualified to testify because his testimony would have helped the jury
understand the facts and evidence of Collins' case. This Court should therefore reverse
the district court, and remand this case for a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
This Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict for the Center.
Collins' case could be easily understood by lay jurors without expert testimony. The
facts showed that the Center had a duty to comprehensively care for Collins, and
reasonably protect her from seizure injuries - as it had for years - due to her vulnerability
and inability to recognize hazards. This created a special relationship between the Center
and Collins. The facts showed that the Center also owed a duty to reasonably protect
Collins because of its own policies, from Collins' IHP, and by application of common
sense to Collins' circumstances. The facts also show that the Center breached its duty to
Collins by failing to even consider the risk of serious injury to Collins if she seizured and
fell from the Center's open swings - let alone take any action to reasonably protect
Collins from undisputedly foreseeable injuries. The jury should have had the opportunity
to determine whether the Center breached its duty to Collins in light of the evidence
presented at trial. For these reasons, this Court must reverse the district court, and
remand this case for a new trial.
This Court must also reverse the district court's refusal to permit Dr. Mustard to
testify as to the standard of care. For the reasons set forth above, the district court abused
its discretion because it either misapplied the law, or simply failed to let a qualified
expert witness testify. This Court must therefore remand this case to the district court for
a new trial.
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